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International Financial Institutions (IFis) play an increasingly 
important role in the international economy. Experiencing the hardships of 
economic crises, nations are able to tum to these institutions for emergency 
lending and aid to stabilize their economies. However, these loans often 
come with conditions that often require but are not limited to austerity 
measures, trade liberalization, or currency devaluation. As more countries 
tum to IFis for crisis lending, unintended consequences may occur, 
especially in the area of human rights. Research disagrees on if these 
programs and their subsequent conditions increase human rights violations, 
and if so, the extent these violations are increased. Two main arguments are 
present in current research. The first argues that structural adjustment 
programs do result in an increase in human rights violations, while the 
second argues that structural adjustment programs actually lowers human 
rights violations until the cost of repayment exceeds new loans. This paper 
seeks to examine both empirical arguments, and then present a critique of 
the current research on the topic. 
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PROCESS ANALYSIS STATEMENT 
The concept for this thesis first began my freshman year when I took Dr. 
Steven Hall's POLS 293 (International Relations) class. At the time, I was exploring 
my options for potential majors and took the class on a whim, thinking it was 
interesting. From there, I was introduced to the world of political economics. I was 
enamored with the theories of negotiation, the economic theories that guided 
international organizations and the conditions International Financial Institutions 
imposed upon nations seeking emergency loans. That same semester, I declared a 
Legal Studies major. Unfortunately, as part of that major, none of the classes that 
addressed political economics counted as electives for my major. 
I still wished to explore this area of research and eventually was able to 
expand my knowledge through POLS 281 (Political and Economic Problems in 
Developing Nations) and POLS 493 (World Politics). In POLS 281, I was able to learn 
about developing nations and their experiences with structural adjustment 
programs and in POLS 493, I learned about how financial crises arose and 
functioned. I loved the material, and when the time came to construct and honors 
thesis I knew I wanted it to capture something regarding developing nations and 
financial crises. The first research question I attempted was if structural adjustment 
programs impeded growth in developing nations, but I quickly found that question 
was far too broad to use. Then, in conjunction with my thesis advisor, I attempted to 
formulate a new question. The second question regarded if structural adjustment 
programs decreased the real wage of trade union workers. However, after a 
literature review, it was found that there was not enough research on the topic to 
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move forward. At this point, I struggled to formulate a question that had both 
enough research and specificity to move forward to a formal literature review. 
Then, I stumbled upon human rights related research. As a future law 
student, human rights were, and still are, an area that captures my interest both in 
terms of economics and in terms of law. It was a perfect combination of my interests 
outside of my major regarding economics and my interests within my chosen field 
regarding international law. I formulated a formal literature review soon after, and 
wrote a thesis that tied together topics I have learned about for the past four years, 
resulting in the culmination of interests both within and outside of my major. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The World Bank and the IMF have served as "lenders oflast resort" since their 
creation as part of the Bretton Woods Agreements in 1944. Since their creation, 
both agencies have endured much criticism about the possible consequences of 
their loan programs. Among these consequences is the possibility that government 
respect for human rights decreases in recipient nations as a result of structural 
adjustment programs-loan programs designed for nations in financial crisis as a 
result of bad policy. This question has become to subject of an empirical debate in 
literature, with arguments criticizing International Financial Institutions (IF Is) and 
arguments supporting them. 
This paper seeks to examine and critique the arguments presented, and will be 
organized as follows: Section I will present context and background regarding the 
World Bank, the IMF, the process in which loans are given to recipient nations and 
why conditions are attached to these loans. It will also make note of the current 
attitude of researchers regarding these institutions' responsibilities toward human 
rights. Section II will address the current theories surrounding the debate on the 
relationship between human rights and International Financial Institution 
agreements, and the subsequent conditions. Section III will present a summary of 
the conflicting findings of the empirical studies, while Section IV will examine the 
methodology used in these studies. Finally, the paper will conclude with a critique of 
the studies and a proposal to include game theory as a new piece of the empirical 
and theoretical puzzle. 
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I. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS: THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF 
International Financial Institutions, or IFis, are an important aspect in 
today's financial markets. They are unique in the sense that both IFis make loan 
disbursements primarily to nations experiencing financial hardships, oftentimes 
even financial crisis. While both the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund have similar functions, they go about their functions in a slightly different 
manner. Both implement structural adjustment programs on conditionality 
rather than collateral, and both possess a non-political mandate and a duty to 
take into account only economic considerations when making decisions on 
potential loan disbursements. The World Bank can be divided into two main 
programs, the IBRD or International Board for Reconstruction and Development, 
and the International Development Association. The IBRD is focused on assisting 
with reconstruction and ensuring both a balance of payments and a balance of 
international trade growth. The International Development Association, or IDA, 
is more focused on development and an increase in standards of living for less 
developed countries. (Bradlow, 1996). 
International financial institutions exist in part to give emergency loans to 
nations experiencing shocks. However, there is a distinction to be made between 
random economic shocks and shocks that are a result of bad policy. The IMF, 
whose goal is to stabilize exchange rates in the international economic system, 
and the World Bank, whose ultimate goal is to reduce poverty, both use a quota 
system to help distinguish between random economic shocks and shocks 
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resultant of bad policy. Nations have a set reserve of international currency that 
they can draw from in the event of economic shocks that is based upon their 
economy. This loan reserve is their "quota". If a nation draws upon more than 
2 5% of its quota, the international financial institution views the shock as a 
result of bad policy. From there, conditions are attached to ensure that the 
institution's loan will be paid. This conditionality comes in the form of structural 
adjustment programs, and can consist of a variety of different policy reforms. 
The reforms may depend on the type of structural adjustment programs 
implemented, which range from programs under the World Bank's IBRD or IDA, 
to programs under the IMF, like the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF), and Stand-by Agreements. In many of these agreements, fiscal austerity, 
tight monetary policies, and currency devaluation are common as a means to re-
stabilize a struggling economy. (Vreeland, 2003). Structural adjustment loans 
are also not given out in their entirety once an agreement is reached. Instead, 
these loans are given on a regular basis given that the conditions a nation has 
agreed to implement are actually implemented. Should there be a lack of 
sufficient implementation, the institutions may withhold loans from recipient 
governments (Bradlow, 1996). 
The World Bank and the IMF were created with limitations upon their power 
specified within their respective articles of agreement. Most importantly, 
although the World Bank and IMF are dedicated to improving development, they 
are limited in their mandates to focus only on the economic side of development. 
Both the IBRD and the IDA have language in their the articles of agreement that 
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states, "Only economic decisions shall be relevant to their decisions, and these 
considerations shall be weighted impartially ... " (Article III Section S(b), IBRD 
Articles of Agreement, Article III Section S(b) IDA Articles of Agreement). 
However, because the World Bank is a United Nations specialized agency, it 
does have a unique set of obligations and requirements that extend to its 
member states (Evans, 2013). Among these obligations are human rights 
respects that are specific to each member state, which the state retains even 
when its representative sits on the board of directors and is directly responsible 
for deciding loan disbursement recipients (Bradlow, 1996). The process of 
actually deciding potential recipients of World Bank Funding involves a 
weighted voting system, where weight is placed upon the amount of money a 
member state contributes to the World Bank's development funds. The weight of 
each member state's vote is proportional to its share of the development funds 
(Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006). However, voting within the World Bank is rare. 
Instead, decisions are made through staff processes and are often made through 
general consensus rather than voting. 
Unlike the World Bank and its subsidiaries the IDA and IBRD, the IMF is not a 
specialized United Nations organization. As such, the IMF has a significantly 
smaller human rights obligation. The IMF was established to assist with the 
regulation of the international monetary system and provide short-term aid to 
member states. When the IMF was established, though, the economic system at 
the time was still reliant a fixed exchange rate. Following the collapse of that 
system, the IMF's job became more complex. When the gold standard gave way 
9 
to the floating exchange rate, the IMF was forced to expand its "economic 
considerations" to include labor, health, and agriculture. These social factors, in a 
floating exchange rate system, could easily have an impact on the international 
financial system (Bradlow, 1996). 
With both the World Bank and the IMF, representatives of the international 
financial institutions and representatives for the potential loan recipient 
governments negotiate with each other on behalf of their respective institution. 
(Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006). Interestingly, during negotiations, the lack of 
transparency in what is defined as "economic considerations" the Articles of 
Agreement make allowable to be taken into consideration for loan 
disbursements can come as an advantage to the international financial 
institutions. These institutions are free to decide themselves which factors are 
"economic" and within their scope of power, and which would be considered 
"political" and, therefore, outside of their scope of power. They can use this 
discretion to decide which issues are available consider when creating and 
negotiating structural adjustment programs with potential recipient states. 
However, this advantage is quickly balanced out by member states having an 
informational advantage regarding the Jack of guidelines on what issues fall 
under the jurisdiction of the international financial institution. Member states 
can assert superior knowledge of local needs and conditions to also achieve a 
better bargaining position for loan disbursements, and can further their own 
human rights agendas, for example the imposition or dissemination of certain 
social programs related to health, labor, agriculture and the like. If they are 
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successful in convincing the international financial institutions these issues 
could also be economic issues (Bradlow, 1996). 
II. THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
Because the World Bank and the IMF give loans to countries experiencing 
financial difficulties or crisis, a primary concern for the institution is ensuring that 
the loans are eventually paid. As a result, reform is often demanded of nations who 
enter into loan agreements with an IFI. As tools for economic reform, structural 
adjustment programs are implemented with the expectation of change. These 
changes typically are directed at increasing the efficiency of a target country's 
economy via favoring market privatization, property rights, and free and 
competitive markets. (De Soysa, Vadlamannati, 2011). However, as part ofthe 
implementation of such policies it is possible unintended consequences may occur, 
particularly in the area of human rights. For example, implementation of structural 
adjustment programs result in riots, social program cuts, reduction in the public 
sector work force, all of which could result in subsequent human rights violations. 
Do structural adjustment programs result in an increase in human rights violations? 
In pursuit of this question, two main arguments surfaced in literature. One 
argument indicates that structural adjustment programs do result in an increase in 
human rights violations. (Cingranelli & Abouharb, 2006, Mitchell & McCormick, 
1988). Counter to this first school of thought, others argue that structural 
adjustment programs only increase human rights violations when the amount a 
country has in arrears exceeds that of new loans that are given by the international 
financial institutions. Prior to that, human rights violations actually decrease as a 
11 
result of structural adjustment programs. (Erikson & De Soysa 2009, De Soysa & 
Vadlammanati, 2011). 
A variety of theories have been presented to explain the potential causal 
chains between structural adjustment programs and human rights, and both the 
potential positive and negative effects. Cingranelli and Abouharb identify both 
potential direct and indirect effects structural adjustment programs may have upon 
the government respect of human rights. Among the direct effects, structural 
adjustment programs may positively affect government respect for human rights as 
a result of structural adjustment programs' necessity for limitations upon the 
government. This idea rests upon the theory that limitations upon the government 
is at the core of all human freedoms, and in turn are to be imperative to human 
rights. By placing limitations upon governments, human rights, gain more 
governmental respect through the simple act of governmental restraint. This is 
especially evident in the area of physical integrity rights, a quantifiable measure of 
human rights. Physical integrity rights are the freedoms all individuals have from 
"arbitrary physical harm and coercion from their government" (Cingranelli & 
Richards, 1999). It is a measure of human rights that consists of instances of 
political imprisonment, disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings 
(Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). Political imprisonment, for example, could be 
diminished, even eliminated, if the government restrained from imprisoning 
individuals for political purposes. Structural adjustment programs could indirectly 
influence governments as a result of the conditionality it imposes, and the oversight 
that comes with conditionality. Because governments may be subject to some 
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oversight from the IFis to prove they are implementing the agreed upon conditions, 
these nations may be less inclined to engage in human rights violations like political 
imprisonment and torture during this time. Structural adjustment programs, while 
not directly placing limits on repression, do place limits in other areas, resulting in 
the conditionality and oversight that still result in the restraint theorized to increase 
respect for human rights (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006). Additionally, limitations 
upon governments reduce barriers to the free market, removing restrictions that 
may prevent people from engaging in interests and opportunities that otherwise 
may not be possible if their freedom was restrained on behalf of an unlimited, or 
less limited, government (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006). Unfortunately, although 
economic freedom and political repression can coexist, Abouharb and Cingranelli do 
not address this possibility. 
However, these structural adjustment programs are also known to generate 
"winners and losers", those that benefit or lose benefits as a result of the program's 
implementation. Cingranelli and Abouharb also address that the acceptance of 
structural adjustment programs, on a very basic level, require sweeping and 
comprehensive changes, especially behavioral changes among many people 
(Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006). These changes could also generate winners and 
losers between those who benefit from the changes versus those who suffer. Losers 
are often prone to resistance as a result of their newfound negative impacts, and 
strong governments are required to contain that resistance. For example, policy 
changes in the form of austerity could, and likely would, result in a reduction of 
public-sector workers. Because many individuals would either lose their jobs or 
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take pay cuts, their spending would also decrease. In the case of Spain, a 
constitutional amendment was passed that forced its government to keep a 
balanced budget (Vargas, Ramos-Escamilla, Garcia, 2016). Naturally, humans 
instinctively resist change, therefore resulting in a primal resistance to the 
programs and the change demanded of them (Abouharb & Cingranelli ,2006). 
How the government chooses to contain the resistance matters, though, as 
political leaders and de facto political leaders like those who may have gained 
power through a military coups, are more likely to use repression over reform if 
reform holds a possibility of a loss of power in the future. (Zack-Williams, 2013). 
Tanzania, for example, did not want to risk the severe conditions the IMF intended 
to attach to its loan. This likely would have resulted in severe dissatisfaction from 
Tanzania's citizens. Even though Tanzania desperately needed the loan, they 
ultimately rejected it (Vreeland, 2003). 
Structural adjustment programs potentially negatively affect human rights. 
Because human rights is a broad category, current empirical research measures 
human rights through physical integrity rights, or the freedoms of individuals from 
political imprisonment, torture, extrajudicial killing, and disappearance. This is 
because these rights are much better quantified in comparison to other possible 
measures of human rights, including access to food, shelter, and clean water. 
However, many theoretical arguments for structural adjustment programs' 
relationship to possible human rights violations do take into account these access 
issues as indications of human rights violations. This is a result of the fact that 
14 
governments must have a substantial presence in the economy to ensure the 
protection of human rights (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006). 
An example of the usage of access to food, clean water, and basic shelter as an 
indication of human rights can be seen in several theoretical arguments addressing 
the relationship between structural adjustment and human rights. In nations that 
had centrally planned economies, among the many aspects nations controlled were 
social programs. When international financial institutions intervened in these 
economies and restructured through structural adjustment programs, the resulting 
conditions had the market, not the government, determine the economy. This shift 
from a centrally planned economy to a market-determined economy also extended 
to social programs. Market forces controlled entitlement to everything, even basic 
human needs like food and shelter. National ownership of natural resources 
privatized and the private sector soon even delved into social assistance and 
financing to the poor. These changes left the private sector in charge of social 
programs and whether or not to provide assistance to vulnerable populations. 
(Thomas, 1998). 
Another direct negative impact upon human rights may be that involvement 
in the economy is imperative in protecting human rights as measured by access to 
basic shelter, food, clean water, and by lessening governmental involvement in the 
economy through privatization mandated by structural adjustment programs, the 
protection of human rights diminish. For example, the elimination of government 
programs akin to food stamps would reduce access to food for many impoverished 
individuals. The lessening of government involvement could also set off a chain 
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reaction regarding governmental discretion and human rights using the measure of 
physical integrity rights. The lack of involvement with governmental leaders would 
result in a subsequent lack of discretion that would extend even to police officers 
and soldiers. This reduction in discretion would then translate in an increase in 
administrative discretion, which would result in a higher likelihood that human 
rights, particularly those that fall under the measure of physical integrity rights, 
would be violated. 
However, De Soysa and Vadlamannati propose an alternate theory regarding 
change-instead, they indicate that nations that have higher rates of change toward 
economic liberalization and have higher levels of this liberalization should have less 
social dissatisfaction. Economic liberalization theoretically, would allow for people 
to naturally solve collective issues, like those of peace and security, by means of the 
"invisible hand." It also results in an empowering of the average citizen through 
resting economic power in the market rather than the government. Economic 
liberalization would allow for power to be held by the people in the form of market 
decisions, and allow for a transfer of power to the citizens from the state. For 
example, new jobs can be created through entrepreneurship that could result in 
unskilled workers ascending into the middle class. This in turn would result in a lack 
of citizen dissatisfaction, because of the lack of dissatisfaction, less state-driven 
repression of human rights (De Soysa, Vadlamannati, 2011). 
There are also a variety of positive and negative indirect effects theorized to 
affect human rights or the lack thereof. Neoliberal economic theory indicates that 
increased economic liberalization leads to higher levels of development. There have 
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been studies that show a relationship between wealthier countries and an increase 
in human rights respect. Wealthier states appear to be more stable than less wealthy 
countries because there is less competition over resources, and as countries 
increase in wealth, political efficacy and demand of the government increases. This 
is reflected through the establishment of institutions like political parties within a 
nation. Wealthier nations are also shown to lean on the democratic side of political 
institutions, again allowing for less social dissatisfaction and a subsequent increase 
in human rights respect. (Poe, Tate, Camp-Keith 1999). 
This relationship then sets off a domino effect in the causal chain. If the 
structural adjustment program's implementation increases the wealth in a nation, 
as it is intended to do, then these nations should in turn increase their respect for 
human rights as an indirect result. Additionally, it has been shown that wealthier 
states are more democratic, and high levels of democracy have been seen alongside 
higher rates of human rights respect, which may come into effect should a structural 
adjustment program succeed in increasing a nation's wealth. However, a disconnect 
exists between the time in structural adjustment implementation and the benefits 
expected from structural adjustment. The effects claimed by this domino effect 
would likely not be captured in empirical studies, because the time line for the long 
term effects of increased democracy would likely take place over the course of 
decades after the structural adjustment program. (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006, 
Mitchell & McCormick, 1988.) 
The "trickle down effect" may also come into play when a structural 
adjustment program is implemented. The concept behind the trickle down effect 
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rests in structural adjustment programs' apparent distribution of wealth. Wealth 
accumulates faster at the top, and then once accumulated it will"trickle down" to 
help the vulnerable populations. The trickle down effect also relies on the neoliberal 
theory that higher economic liberalization will cause economic development, which 
will then result in higher respect for human rights. In fact, every positive indirect 
effect above relies on this basic theory to be successful. Cingranelli and Abouharb 
argue that although there has been ample time to show that rapid economic 
liberalization would result in higher levels of economic development, there is not 
evidence of the connection. 
Then there is the trickle down theory, where economic gains of structural 
adjustment programs concentrate with the rich and ruling elites. The distribution of 
wealth should eventually flow to vulnerable populations, however there is also the 
possibility that the rich and ruling elites retain all of the gains from the structural 
adjustment programs., and these gains never actually flow down to the vulnerable 
populations. These elites then displace the burden imposed by these programs to 
the vulnerable populations, who are typically poor and lack political power to resist 
(De Soysa, Vadlamannati 2011). This theory of "trickle down" is illustrated through 
the case of Pakistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Being a largely agrarian 
economy, the structural adjustment program implemented in Pakistan focused on 
putting Pakistan in a better position to compete with other nations in international 
trade through producing what was most economically advantageous for them. In 
this case, Pakistan's economic advantage relative to other nations was cash crops. 
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Additionally, the program also closed a variety of industries in the public 
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sector and removed some subsidies on utilities and foodstuffs. However, not only 
was Pakistan an agriculturally based economy, it also held a feudal based structure 
within its society. According to the 2000 Agricultural Census, only 37% of the rural 
population owned land, with only 2% ofthat population owning 50 acres or more, 
which amounted to 30% of the overall land. According to HIES data, 33% of 
cultivated land was under a landlord-tenant relationship and 18% was 
sharecropping (World Bank, 2007). The vast majority of land ownership was 
concentrated to an elite few. These elites enjoyed the benefits that came with 
encouraging the production and trade of cash crops, but the average citizen and the 
poor and vulnerable suffered through the repeal of subsidies and public industry 
without the agricultural benefits to offset that cost (Bhutta, 2001). 
Potential explanations for indirect negative effects of structural adjustment 
programs also rely on a larger theoretical support. In order for these explanations to 
be possible, support must exist that rapid economic liberalization results in a 
decrease in respect for human rights. Cingranelli and Abouharb maintain that unlike 
the indirect positive effects, the theoretical basis for the indirect negative effects has 
plentiful empirical evidence to support it. The first of the negative indirect effects is 
that structural adjustment programs have a disproportionately burdensome effect 
on vulnerable populations, particularly those of women, children, public sector 
workers, and low wage workers. These individuals are often those who rely on the 
state for support, often through programs that are the first targets for budget cuts as 
part of austerity measures demanded through structural adjustment agreements 
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with the international financial institutions. This is largely the result of what 
Zulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta claims is a lack of oversight from the international financial 
institutions because these institutions only meet with nation leaders four times a 
year to discuss conditions. However, this theory of a lack of oversight directly 
conflicts with the theory that increased oversight may result in a lack of human 
rights violations. When an agreement is made, governments are often free to decide 
where to place the cuts in its expenditures and aside from quarterly review; the 
international financial institutions do not pay specific attention to the nation 
(Bhutta, 2001). In an effort to retain power, these governments will gravitate 
towards programs that will not jeopardize a reelection. Welfare programs benefit 
the poor and vulnerable populations, a majority of whom do not, or cannot, lobby 
for the preservation of social welfare programs. Because there is a lack of 
organization to lobby policymakers, austerity measures will often result in cuts to 
social welfare programs (Nooruddin, Simmons, 2006). Ireland, for example, cut its 
welfare programs in 2009 and 2010. The cuts resulted in significant decreases to 
child benefit payments, caregiver allowances, and single parent supplements. In the 
same years, Ireland also cut public sector pay and social security payments 
(Hardiman, Regan 2013). Sub-Saharan Africa endured significant cuts to education 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Tanzania, for example, suffered a cut from 11.7% to 4.8% in 
education expenditures (Zack-Williams, 2013). 
It is also noted that the type of rapid economic liberalization demanded by 
structural adjustment programs in fact can breed domestic conflicts (Dreher, 
Gassebner, 2012). This is because structural adjustment programs necessitate 
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governments pass unpopular policies in order to receive international financial 
institution aid. These policies inevitably result in greater burdens particularly on the 
most vulnerable and most reliant on social service programs for their basic needs. 
When these programs suffer and/or are cut as a result of austerity measures, these 
citizens engage in protest against these reductions, even at times resorting to 
violence. One of the options governments have to handle these protests and the 
general opposition of the people is through repression. For example, in Spain during 
the aftermath of the 2008 debt crisis, the Spanish people took to the streets in 
protest, and the Spanish government responded through repression. The right to 
protest, even peacefully, was suspended and fines ranging from 30 to 30,000 euros 
were given to those who did not comply. Notably, the press was not always exempt 
from this fine, also resulting in a repression of freedom of the press to fairly cover 
such protests in the news (Vargas, Ramos-Escamilla & Garcia, 2016). 
When tackling the question of ethnic conflicts, though, some studies also 
indicate that structural adjustment programs may also lower ethnic tensions 
instead of increasing them. These studies propose that the conditions required by 
international financial institutions, when combined with high social 
fractionalization, lower tensions between ethnic groups. Structural adjustment 
programs, because they allow for access to loans in tandem with policy reforms and 
guidance. Emergency funding in the form of structural adjustment loans may allow 
for countries to avoid or mitigate crisis by stabilizing their economies and 
implementing conditions necessary for the elimination of bad policy, which would 
also allow for citizens to avoid the effects of that crisis. Citizens of the minority 
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ethnicity may favor intervention from an impartial third party as opposed to the 
ethnic ruling majority, due to a lack of perception that they may be discriminated 
against on the basis of their ethnicity. (Vadlammanati, Ostmoe, De Soysa, 2014). 
The increase of conflicts within a state also hinders democratic development, 
which as stated above has been empirically shown to have a positive relationship 
with human rights respects. Structural adjustment programs force democracies to 
make difficult, and often-unpopular decisions that will be often met by the 
opposition of the people. Requiring the implementation of policies thatthe people, 
whom democracy is supposed to represent, oppose puts international financial 
institutions in a position where they are essentially circumventing the point of a 
democracy. (Dreher, Gassebner, 2012, Thomas, 1998, Abouharb & Cingranelli 
2007). Structural adjustment programs may exacerbate the weakening of 
democracy by not only forcibly implementing policies the people oppose, but also 
because implementation of unpopular reform requires a government that can 
withstand the inevitable dissatisfaction. In order to withstand citizen dissatisfaction, 
governments must have a certain amount of political power to stifle the opposition 
to the policies. In order for a structural adjustment program to be successful, the 
government must be able to overpower the resistance to its policy changes. In the 
case of Nigeria and Guinea in the 1980s and early 1990s, structural adjustment 
programs appeared to reinforce authoritarian tendencies because the states elected 
to repress human rights to retain the power it needed to implement its reforms. 
(Ibhawoh, 1999). Because implementation of structural adjustment policies only 
needs the approval of the executive branch of a government, it is possible to 
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unilaterally sign an agreement with the IMF or World Bank, again potentially 
reinforcing authoritarian tendencies (Vreeland, 2005). 
In the case of Spain, the 2008 debt crisis caused a marked decline in the 
Spanish economy, and eventually resulted in Spain undertaking a structural 
adjustment program in 2010. As part of the program, Spain enacted a variety of 
policy reforms that were extremely unpopular with its citizens, including pay cuts to 
social servants, suspending the right to free healthcare to illegal immigrants, a 
substantial reduction in homeless shelters, a variety oflabor reforms in both 2010 
and 2012, the most recent of which allowed for firms to opt out of collective 
bargaining agreements with unions regarding reduced compensation and fair 
dismissal, and over 325,000 layoffs since 2010. (Vargas, Ramos-Escamilla & Garcia, 
2016). 
III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The question of the relationship between IFI structural adjustment programs 
and human rights is, by nature, an empirical one. Within the empirical studies, two 
main results emerge. The first finding is that structural adjustment programs 
resulted in a decrease in human rights as defined by physical 'integrity rights. 
Physical integrity rights are the freedoms all individuals have from "arbitrary 
physical harm and coercion from their government" (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). 
It is a measure of human rights that consists of instances of political imprisonment, 
disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). 
The second result indicated that although there was a time when a decrease in 
physical integrity rights occurred, specifically when the arrearage a nation owed 
23 
was more than what new programs were giving to other nations, before this point 
structural adjustment programs actually increased government respect for human 
rights violations. 
Mitchell and McCormick (1988) find that in terms of theories, the simple 
poverty theory is more likely when considering the rates of political imprisonment, 
one of the measured aspects of physical integrity rights, the standard measure of 
human rights within research regarding the relationship between human rights and 
structural adjustment programs. The theory states an inverse relationship between 
wealth and human rights violations. The poorest countries are the most prone to 
repress human rights because the government seeks to maintain order in the face of 
the social and political challenges presented as a result of economic scarcity. They 
find that the richer a nation, the less that nation tends to have political prisoners. 
Additionally, they find that when comparing the age of a country versus its 
background as a former colony or not, background as a colony has more of an 
impact on human rights violations, and that political imprisonment is the most 
commonly violated physical integrity right. However, Mitchell and McCormick find 
all of the tests run resulted in "weak to moderate" support for their hypotheses, 
leading the two to conclude that none of their explanations were "complete", 
partially as a result of a need for more multivariate analyses for the variety of 
alternative explanations of what may cause human rights violations within a nation. 
(Mitchell & McCormick, 1988). 
Seven years later, through the usage of a dummy variable to measure reform, 
Abouharb and Cingranelli found that their results strengthened past studies in the 
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area of structural adjustment programs and human rights respect. All other 
conditions remaining the same, nations that did not enter into or currently have a 
structural adjustment program had a probability of torture at 5%. This probability 
increases to 31% for countries that did enter into and implemented structural 
adjustment programs, a major increase of 26%. Additionally, interstate conflicts 
were found to be an insignificant indication of government respect for human rights 
and entrance into structural adjustment programs. However, it was found that 
nations that received World Bank assistance in the form of a structural adjustment 
program decreased government respect for all five categories physical integrity 
rights once the p-value reached .11 for political imprisonment. Prior to that 
measure, it is statistically insignificant. (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006) 
Countering these empirical results, Erikson and De Soysa, using the 
Economic Freedom Index or EFI to measure reform, found that the total debt of a 
nation decreases physical integrity rights, but even when placing all variables at 
their respective means and raising debt by its highest value, human rights respect 
would only decrease by one point in the scale. This value in and of itself is noted to 
be highly unrealistic and "quite a bit lower" than the effect of being indebted in 
comparison. They also find oil exports to have a highly statistically significant 
relationship to government repression of physical integrity rights, where nations 
with high oil exports also tend to have a high probability of repressing physical 
integrity rights. The importance of the loan mattered as well, where an increase in 
importance was seen alongside a decrease in violations of physical integrity rights 
(Erikson & De Soysa, 2009). 
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Alongside these results came the observation regarding arrearage and 
payback. Once these were taken into consideration both IMF programs and the 
World Bank's IDA programs were found to have negative effects on physical 
integrity rights. Governments that had higher amounts of arrearage had Jess respect 
for physical integrity rights, especially in the case of the IDA, where IDA payback 
periods resulted in the largest effect on human rights violations (Erikson & De 
Soysa, 2009). 
A year later, De Soysa and Vadlammanati found that the direction of causality 
is unidirectional when looking at structural adjustment programs and government 
respect for human rights. In a pure statistical test, they found that positive economic 
reforms appeared to cause increases in respect for human rights, and that the 
opposite, that increases in human rights respect cause an increase in economic 
reforms is not the case. The results also indicated that free market policies had a 
strongly positive effect on human rights, and that through the ordinary least square 
regression employed in their model, there was a 39% increase in respect for 
physical integrity rights with standard deviation increase. There was also a positive 
relationship with an increase in GDP and an increase in human rights, as well as a 
negative relationship between population size and human rights, where larger 
countries had Jess respect for human rights in the form of physical integrity rights. 
Interestingly, there was a significant relationship between ethnic fractionalization 
and government respect of physical integrity rights, where higher rates of ethnic 
fractionalization resulted in more respect of physical integrity rights. Conflicts did 
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cause less respect for physical integrity rights, while reforms increased human 
rights conditions in nations that had lower levels of respect to begin with. 
IV. METHODS 
Between the two main empirical arguments regarding if structural 
adjustment programs increase violations of human rights rests a debate in methods. 
In some cases, reform is measured through a dummy variable indicating that a 
structural adjustment program was present in a particular nation (Cingranelli & 
Abouharb 2006, Cingranelli & Abouharb 2007, Mitchell & McCormick 1988). In 
other cases, reform is measured through the Frasier Institute's Economic Freedom 
Index, or the EFI. Unlike dummy variables, the EFI allows for a more comprehensive 
approach to measuring reform because it incorporates expenditure and tax reforms, 
property rights and legal reforms, trade reforms, reforms involving sound money, 
and labor, business and credit reforms (De Soysa & Vadlammanati, 2011, Erikson & 
De Soysa 2009). This particular method comes with its own limitations; the data 
used was limited as a result of EFI data not being available for all years presented in 
the CIRI human rights index, which was used to measure the violations of human 
rights in the study. 
Nearly every modern empirical study on this question, however, has some 
overlap in methodology. The Cingranelli and Richards, or CIRI, dataset is employed 
to measure human rights violations. The CIRI dataset is a cross-national time series 
dataset that measures a government's respect for human rights through physical 
integrity rights. These rights include torture, political murder, disappearance, and 
political killing. The dataset is comprised of 29 nations, including all geographic 
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regions and political systems, each with a population size of over 750,000 people in 
1981. Its years ranged from 1981 to 1996 in three-year intervals. Eleven percent of 
these nations were considered to be fully developed, while the remaining 89% were 
classified as developing nations. Each nation was scored on a scale of 0-2, with 0 
representing frequent human rights violations and 2 representing no violations. 
In addition to the usage of the CIRI dataset to measure human rights 
violations, nearly every study also incorporated the use of OLS regression to arrive 
at its results. Using OLS regression, each study employed its own techniques to 
control for endogeneity bias and to check for robustness of the data. Erikson & De 
Soysa use a combination of an AR1 process and alternative tests using Newey-West 
standard errors. In addition, each model in the study was tested with and without 
lagged dependent variables to address both autocorrelation and the possibility that 
political leaders use their past decisions regarding repression as a reference to 
decide whether or not to repress human rights. (Erikson & De Soysa, 2009). 
This implementation of the lagged dependent variable was again used a year 
later in De Soysa and Vadlammanati's study of structural adjustment programs and 
human rights violations, which also incorporates GOP per capita in order to control 
for the effects of development within nations. It further includes data from the ERS 
dataset to control for economic growth rates. Other variables controlled for include 
a log of the total population, measure of regime type, degree of ethnic 
fractionalization, and an inclusion of a dummy variable measuring civil conflict that 
triggers a 1 if deaths are more than 25 as a result of armed conflict, 0 if not. 
Additionally, to control for the possibility that legal heritage may influence a 
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nation's decisions to repress or not repress human rights another dummy variable 
is employed. It triggers a 1 if a nation's legal heritage derives from the UK, France, 
Germany, Scandinavia, or Socialism. If a nation derives its legal heritage elsewhere, 
it is given a value of 0. To address the issue of direction of causality and 
endogeneity, De Soysa and Vadlammanati use a dynamic model of Granger causality. 
As part of this model, one variable is considered to cause another if the past values 
of the former variable help explain the latter after the latter's influence is already 
taken into account. 
Shifting to the methods used by Abouharb and Cingranelli, dummy variables 
are used to measure reform. Control for the endogeneity bias rests in a bivariate 
pro bit to account for the possibility that the direction of causality is in fact mutual, 
meaning human rights practices may affect which nations receive loans as much as 
loans may cause human rights practices to either rise or fall. A bivariate probit, 
however, requires the usage of dichotomous dependent variables for both stages of 
its determination. Because of this requirement, Cingranelli and Abouharb were 
forced to shift from the CIRI data set's three-point measure of physical integrity 
rights to a two-point measure of physical integrity rights. Cingranelli and Abouharb 
also note that there is variatio_n on the effectiveness of these programs due to 
regimes not always fully implementing structural adjustment programs. Controls for 
democratization, wealth, population size, civil conflict, and alliances for major 
donors to IFis are also all controlled for within the model used by Cingranelli and 
Abouharb. (Cingranelli & Abouharb, 2006). 
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V. CRITIQUE 
However, there are weaknesses to all of the empirical studies that seek to 
answer the question if structural adjustment agreements increase human rights 
violations. Abouharb and Cingranelli's usage of a binary variable for measuring 
reform resulted in their finding that structural adjustment programs increase 
human rights violations. Their measure of reform consisted of a dummy variable 
that set to 0 in the years reviewed that had no presence of a structural adjustment 
program and a 1 for the years that a structural adjustment agreement was made. 
While the dummy variable used is simpler than using an index akin to the Economic 
Freedom Index, it also runs the risk of oversimplifying reform enough to skew 
results. It is this exact issue that led De Soysa and Vadlammanati to use the 
Economic Freedom Index, or EFI, which is comprised of 5 sub indices that are 
characterized through 35 object indicators to measure reform. The sub-indices are 
divided into reforms related to access to sound money, labor, business, and credit 
reforms, trade reforms, property and tax reforms, expenditure and tax reforms, and 
property rights and legal reforms. This usage of a series of sub indices covers 
reform more broadly and takes into account the aspects of reform that comes from 
conditionality. This should allow for a more accurate picture of a nation's actual 
reform measures- for example, one nation's conditionality may incorporate 
agricultural concerns, while another's may not, but the fact that the index has an 
interval measurement could also give a false impression of the relationship between 
its variables. 
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Reform is not the same for every country, and as a result different reforms 
may result in differences in human rights practices within that country. It is 
unreasonable to use a dummy variable with a division only measuring years where 
reform agreements were made, because reform is a broad category with many 
individual variables that go into what actually constitutes a particular "reform." The 
division presented by the dummy variable cannot fully capture the theoretical 
concept because it does oversimplify reform to the point that Abouharb & 
Cingranelli's results would be unable to fully encompass the variation of 
conditionality that each individual country may experience. In terms of the index, it 
is reasonable to consider the index variable, in this case, structural adjustment 
programs, as interval level data. In this case, measuring the extent of structural 
adjustment programs matters because different countries have different extents of 
conditionality and implementation of these programs-a nation may agree to one 
thing, but implement only a portion of its agreement. Using an index that codifies 
how much structural adjustment was present would therefore reveal more accurate 
results, but only if the intervals would match the differences in reform, which may 
not always, be the case. 
De Soysa's and Vadlammanati's findings appear in line with Alfred B Zack-
Williams, in that the reforms generated as a result of IFI structural adjustment 
programs generate both winners and losers. These losers are the most likely to 
resist, possibly violently, to the reforms. Notably, while all of these studies touch on 
the concept of game theory, be it through the generation of winners and losers or 
the recognition that IFI structural adjustment programs' implementation through a 
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two-level bargaining game, none directly address the theory within their studies 
(Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006, Zack-Williams, 2013). 
Game theory should be addressed when looking at the relationship between 
human rights violations and structural adjustment programs. The conditionality 
imposed as a result of these programs, which in turn is an apparent cause of these 
violations, is the result of bargaining between the International Financial 
Institutions and the potential recipient governments (Conway, 2004). Participation 
in IMF programs, for example, is largely comprised of a series of interwoven 
decisions that are made over time between the recipient government and staff 
andjor directors of the IMF. During this time, recipient governments must consider 
the costs and benefits of entering into an IMF agreement, while the IMF considers 
the recipient country's ability to implement the reforms it thinks are necessary 
conditions for bringing that nation's economy back into balance with the rest of the 
world (Conway, 2004). 
When looking at the bargaining between the international financial 
institutions and the potential recipient governments, a two level game emerges. This 
is briefly addressed by Abouharb and Cingranelli, but does not offer much in ways of 
explanation (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2006). The two level bargaining game 
between the state, the international financial institution, their creditor states, and 
the state's constituents matters within the context of human rights violations 
because states are often seen to favor "politically easy" targets for austerity. Part of 
this tendency to target austerity at programs dedicated to aid the most vulnerable 
populations could result form the fact that states are caught in between its desire to 
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satisfy both the international financial institution and its constituents. What may 
appear rational at one level of the game could be an unfeasible political move at the 
second level. 
The state also runs two significant risks. If it refuses to implement conditions 
set by the international financial institution, it could ostracize itself from the 
institutions and find itself at the receiving end of IF! retaliation. This could take a 
variety of forms, including the cessation of loans all together. However, should the 
state take the opposite approach and implement conditions that could potentially 
harm its constituents, the state then runs a domestic risk of retaliation from those 
who are negatively affected from the conditions. These groups could mobilize and 
protest against the government, going as far as to risk the government's power 
(Lehman & McCoy, 1992, Rene-Vargas, Ramos-Escamilla, & Garcia, 2016). 
In the case of debt crises, the state is forced into a more precarious situation. 
Should it choose to favor its constituents, the cessation of loans is a much more 
severe consequence, and its bargaining power is diminished. Should it choose to 
favor the international financial institutions, the bargaining power of the people is 
significantly increased, again resulting in a lack of power from the state. While the 
choice to impose debt burdens through austerity onto a government's constituents 
does give positive outlooks on capital and overall growth, it also gives a choice to 
the labor and capital sectors of that government. As the government decides where 
austerity cuts will go, labor and capital are given the choice to either accept or reject 
these measures when they are imposed upon them. Should they choose to reject the 
austerity measures, it is possible that the resistance could result in forcibly 
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positioning the government into an involuntary defection from its structural 
adjustment agreement with its respective international financial institution 
(Lehman & McCoy 1992). 
The studies that ignore how bargaining and game theory plays in the 
negotiations for structural adjustment program conditions also ignore a vital part of 
the relationship between these program conditions and human rights. Measuring 
reform through a dummy variable oversimplifies the concept of reform to a point 
where the data is inaccurate because it does not encompass the variation that exists 
within reform, but even an index like the EFI would only provide a piece of the 
puzzle. Both of these limitations could expose an endogeneity bias within the 
studies, which would render the results meritless. Game theory has to be taken into 
consideration; because the conditions claimed to be the driving force to causing 
these human rights violations are determined through bargaining and negotiations. 
Cingranelli and Abouharb fail firstly in their measure of reform, and secondly 
through their lack of attention to these negotiations. As a result, not only is their 
measurement of reform inappropriate for the study because the data would 
consider all reforms to either cause or not cause human rights violations, but also 
their results would be artificially inflated towards the conclusion that structural 
adjustment programs result in higher human rights violations. 
By ignoring game theory and negotiations, Cingranelli and Abouharb are also 
ignoring the possibility that potential recipient nations may actually want the 
conditions imposed through structural adjustment programs. There could be a 
variety of reasons why a nation would wish to have IF! intervention outside of 
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necessity, be it to have a third party to blame for unpopular reforms or to have a 
third party to assure investors that the nation is capable of and working toward 
financial reform. Using an IFI structural adjustment program to pass unpopular 
reforms, theoretically, would result in more opposition from the people without an 
IFI agreement, otherwise the government would not have the incentive to enter into 
the agreement for this purpose. Less opposition, then, should result in less human 
rights violations committed by the governments. 
Ignoring the impact of negotiations between the IFls and their potential loan 
recipient governments also ignores the possibility that some political influences 
may, either consciously or unconsciously, come into play when giving conditions for 
structural adjustment programs. There are bodies of literature addressing the 
question if IFI's are more likely to give relaxed conditions to to allies of major 
contributory states like the United States (Dreher & Jensen, 2007, Fleck & Kilby, 
2006, Momani, 2004). Nations that have previously failed structural adjustment 
programs are often given new programs with less conditions attached, so according 
to these studies, should also have less human rights violations following the 
implementation of fewer conditions. However, with a binary measure of reform this 
nuance would be unable to be determined because it would simply indicate that 
another agreement was made. Even in the case of the EFI index, which was used by 
De Soysa and Vadlammanati, the index only indicates which types of reforms may 
have been made, not how these were chosen. Therefore, the issues of political 
influence and a nation's potential preference for a structural adjustment program 
and by extension, IFI imposed conditionality remain. 
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Within the scope of human rights violations, game theory may be able to 
answer the question why governments tend to favor cuts to the most vulnerable 
members of society. Given the above situation of the state, it would make sense that 
the state chooses targets for austerity that are the least likely to experience 
resistance, even if the reason for this lack of resistance is that members affected are 
either too poor or too disadvantaged to protest the newly imposed measures. 
Without an examination of the relationship between human rights violations and 
structural adjustment programs through game theory, the studies are incomplete in 
their theories into the "why" human rights violations appear to increase, either 
overall or to an extent, in nations that implement structural adjustment programs. 
Empirically, Abouharb and Cingranelli lack in an accurate and appropriate measure 
of reform, because a dummy variable triggering a 1 for years a nation made a 
structural adjustment agreement does not take into account how the agreement was 
made, the conditions in which the agreement was made, and/or if there was an 
effect from a prior agreement the nation had with an I Fl. The studies examined also 
appear to have results that may show structural adjustment programs result in 
more human rights violations than actually are present, because none of the studies 
address the bargaining and negotiations that give rise to the conditions that nations 
agree to abide by in exchange for the loan money provided. Without this discussion, 
studies on the implications of structural adjustment programs upon human rights 
would be inevitably incomplete. 
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